



Academic due process is brand new as a term, young as an idea having formal
dimensions, but of venerable antiquity in some elements of its practice. The differ-
ence in age among these aspects is obvious when one considers the sparse use which
has thus far been made of the chief approaches commonly applied to the study of a
socially operative principle:
I. The concept of academic due process does not appear as yet to have received
preliminary attention by writers on the history of ideas.
2. In the growing literature of academic freedom, reference is customarily made
to academic due process as a chief instrument, but there is little critical analysis.
3. Studies of the college or university as an institution sometimes refer to the
procedures which constitute due process, but these are not subjected to much
scrutiny. Social studies 6f a more general kind, such as those dealing with the
major forces at work in human arrangements, do not deal especially with academic
due process.
4. Due process in law offers a conspicuously available analogue. The kinship is
often noted, but there seems to be no sibling study.
5. Fortunately, there is a solid body of case history in the record of controversies
between administrations and faculty members. Most of the record is in an academic
context, but there is some legal material.
6. Happily, there are five more or less explicit and detailed policy statements.
Of the four by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), that of
1915 has single sponsorship, while those of 1925, 194o, and 1958 have been jointly
promulgated by the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges (AAC). The
fifth statement, Academic Due Process, first gave the thing a name in a document
designed for wide circulation; it was published by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) in 1954.
The present article is mainly a systematic analysis bringing together the elements
of recent case history and the elements noticed in the policy statements just referred
to. However, the unexplored approaches just remarked upon are not lost sight of;
from time to time there is introduced an observation, a suggestion, or even an
obiter dictum.
*A.B. 1927, A.M. 1930, Ph.D. X932, Harvard University. Associate Secretary, American Association
of University Professors (AAUP).
In this article the writer speaks only for himself; the Association is in no way responsible for the views
expressed. References to AAUP materials are limited to published documents.
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There exists one further introductory obligation. The policy statements involved
are due their own brief history as entities before they are dismembered and their
parts distributed for purposes of comparative study.
In 1915, the newly-formed American Association of University Professors received
from its Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure a Declaration of Principles-
which based its discussion of academic freedom upon consideration of: "(i) the
scope and basis of the power exercised by those bodies having ultimate legal authority
in academic affairs; (2) the nature of the academic calling; (3) the function of the
academic institution or university." The document, it should be noted, gives much
attention to academic responsibility, as well as to academic freedom. The final
section of the Declaration of Principles is entitled "Practical Proposals," and discusses
briefly the "formulation of grounds for dismissal" and "judicial hearings before dis-
missal." It is here that the AAUP first lists procedures: (i) charges should be in
writing and "formulated with reasonable definiteness"; (2) there should be a fair
trial before a "special or permanent judicial committee chosen by the faculty
senate or council, or by the faculty at large"; (3) the teacher should have "full
-opportunity to present evidence" with adequate provision for expert testimony if his
,competence is at issue.
In effect the 1915 Declaration of Principles proposed that a responsible profession
-police itself, and practical suggestions about procedure are offered. From the vantage
point of fifty years' experience, it is significant that the procedures mentioned are
'not given a name, and that there is no indication whether they are considered
minimal, reasonably complete, or actual good practice. There is, of course, much
implication of due process in such phrases as "suitable judicial bodies" and "fair
trial." And it should not be forgotten that the Declaration of Principles was
-drafted during the first year of life of the Association, a year during which no
less than eleven specific cases alleging infringement of academic freedom were
brought to the new organization. Even though the document has little to say
about procedures, a great deal of attention to some kind of due process must have
'been going on because of the case situation.
In 1925, the American Council on Education called a conference to discuss the
-principles of academic freedom, and the AAUP was largely involved. Emphasis
fell upon the restatement of "good academic customs and usage" rather than upon
'The Committee members preparing the report were: Edwin R. A. Seligman (Economics), Columbia
'University, Chairman; Charles E. Bennett (Latin), Cornell University; James Q. Dealey (Political Science),
Brown University; Edward C. Elliott (Education), University of Wisconsin; Richard T. Ely (Economics),
University of Wisconsin; Henry W. Farnam (Political Science), Yale University; Frank A. Fetter (Eco-
nomics), Princeton University; Guy Stanton Ford (History), University of Minnesota; Charles A. Kofoid
-(Zoology), University of California; James P. Liehtenberger (Sociology), University of Pennsylvania;
.Arthur 0. Lovejoy (Philosophy), The Johns Hopkins University; Frederick W. Padelford (English),
University of Washington; Roscoe Pound (Law), Harvard University; Howard C. Warren (Psychology),
Princeton University; Ulysses G. Weatherly (Sociology), Indiana University. The report was received
by the first president of the Association, John Dewey. Of the signers, only Professor Roscoe Pound
survives. Professors Elliott, Ford, and Lichtenberger became disassociated before the report was signed.
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the development of new principles.F In any event, the 1925 Conference Statement
was within a year endorsed by the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges.
The 1925 Conference Statement is a much shorter document than that of 1915.
With respect to due process, it emphasizes the principles of confrontation, as its
predecessor had not done; but it yields ground in suggesting that the limit of faculty
strength is to present a useful expert opinion on a case, in contrast to 1915 when it
had been strongly indicated that the judgment of a faculty hearing committee should
be essentially conclusive. The due process section is short, and only a few specifics
are noted.
In 194o, after a quarter of a century of experience in the handling of numerous
cases, the Association again addressed itself to the problem-in few words but with
enlarged import-and published the 194o Statement of Principles. Dismissal for cause
is franldy made the issue, but there is a sharp line drawn between the teacher on
tenure and the teacher on term appointment. For the tenure professor, the burden
of proof rests upon the administration; for the teacher on limited appointment, the
situation is reversed and it is he who must make a prima facie case of violation
of academic freedom. As to specific safeguards, some are emphasized, some are less
certainly present, but the sum total of recommended procedural protection is un-
questionably larger. Furthermore, as Metzger says: "The tendency ... is clear: it is
to make the faculty hearing as much as possible like a criminal court room and
to protect, by legal rule, the rights of the teacher at the bar.' 3
Then, in 1958, stimulated by the apparent need for more detailed guidance, and
perhaps spurred by the friendly competition offered by the 1954 Academic Due
Process of the ACLU, the AAUP and the AAC, working together, produced a State-
ment on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings. The foreword
notes that the Statement is a supplement to the 1940 Statement of Principles pro-
viding a "formulation of the 'academic due process' that should be observed in dis-
missal proceedings." The standards, however, are a "guide" and "not intended to
establish a norm."
Meanwhile, in 1954, the American Civil Liberties Union had published Academic
Due Process, prepared by its Academic Freedom Committee. This document appears
to be the first comprehensive statement of the elements of the subject, and, as has
been noted, brings the term into common use.4 The subtitle reads "A statement
' This brief history of the development of the AAUP policy statements rests upon the occasional
editorial notes which have accompanied their printings in the AAUP Bulletin; independent historical
research has not been undertaken by the writer. In addition to the classic apologies about lack of
space and time, it is necessary to take into account the fact that a comprehensive history of the AAUP is
presently being written by Professor Walter P. Metzger of the History Department of Columbia University;
the Metzger study will provide ample context and guidance for further study.
'Letter from Professor Walter P. Metzger to the author, Feb. 14, r963. The Metzger letter presents
an analysis of the controlling forces which over the years have shaped the due process aspects of the
AAUP policy statements. It is impossible to indicate the degree to which these pages are indebted to Mr.
Metzger, who wrote at length and most thoughtfully to a colleague at the very time he himself was
deeply engaged in his own research and writing.
' When opportunity permits, the present writer hopes to explore, as a matter of semantic interest, the
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of desirable procedures applicable within educational institutions in cases involving
academic freedom." This restriction to academic freedom cases was quite in keep-
ing with the limitation the ACLU imposes upon itself as a civil liberties organization.
But there is certainly nothing in Academic Due Process which makes it inapplicable
to the trial of issues other than academic freedom.
I
Tim RATIONALE OF ACADEMIC DUE PRocEss
Basically, academic due process is a system of procedures designed to produce
the best possible judgments in those personnel problems of higher education which
may yield a serious adverse decision about a teacher. What is sought after is a
"clear, orderly, fair" way of making a decision; it is desirable to provide the
individual with "procedural safeguards" or "procedural guarantees"; more pallidly,
there should be "normal dismissal proceedings"; or going back to earlier usage, the
need is for "due process." But the matter is somewhat more complicated than
these phrases suggest.
For example, the immediate institutional context, or the broader general social
context, can change in ways that will affect procedure. If the main principles being
applied, those of academic freedom, are distorted by pressures from without, let us
say pressures resulting from fear about national security, then the procedural
instrument is likely to bend under stress. For example, the ebb and flow of American
devotion to the principles of democracy is bound to affect a procedure which in so
many ways depends upon fair application of the power of the people. For example,
mere excitement and resulting publicity, i.e., the psychological milieu, the mob spirit,
may limit the use of academic due process-a system of procedures which cannot
return even a single "be damned to you" without contradicting its own principle.
Consequently, the rationale of academic due process must take into account
more than the central fact of its intrinsic nature. At least this much:
i. Academic due process, hopefully and in its best moments, is a system which
controls positive as well as negative academic action. Twenty years ago, Professor
E. C. Kirkland, writing soon after the adoption of the 1940 Statement of Principles,
indicated the fullness of the coverage:' "The work of everyone would be eased if only
due process became an integral part of academic procedures and standards relating
to faculty personnel." More recently, a study of tenure in American higher educa-
origin of the term "academic due process." He knows that at some time between his first Academic
Freedom Committee work with the ACLU in 1946 and his becoming the executive ofilcer of the ACLU
Academic Freedom Committee in 1951, he began to use the term; he was certainly responsible for the-
title of the 1954 document. But among the distinguished persons at work on academic freedom in
the ACLU from 1946 to 1954 were such figures as Karl Llewellyn, Walter Gellhorn, and Alonzo F.
Myers; it would be well to study the record of the exchanges heard on Olympus before jumping to con-
clusions. The first reference to "academic due process" in AAUP literature appears to be in the
Report of Committee A, z956-57, signed by Professor H. Bentley Glass as chairman, 43 A.A.U.P. Buu.
515, 519 (1957).
5 Kirkland, Annual Report for Committee A, 29 A.A.U.P. BuLL. '64 (1943).
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tion, in describing the desirable procedures for this important area of decisions, gives
as much attention to those which are affirmative in nature and award tenure as
to the painful, negative decisions which involve dismissal.6
2. Academic due process is analogous to legal due process, but only that and
often different. Authorities in the field are careful to point out that identity of the
two cannot be maintained, and that it is also incorrect to think of the academic as
a variant of the legal type. As Professor John M. Maguire says :'
For many years the AAUP has labored . . . to establish the propositions that there
ought to be an accepted uniform academic law of customary nature ... and that this law
can be best administered without the often heated publicity of ordinary court trials before
tribunals cognizant of the presuppositions of our vast American educational enterprise....
The judicial tendency is to squeeze education into a common mold with other working
relationships.
Likewise, Professor Robert K. Carr notes that8 "The Association has been properly
reluctant to see the development and enforcement of standards of academic freedom
and tenure tied too closely to the law-making and law-enforcement processes." Pro-
fessor Carr does go on to say that there is a duty to "try to acquaint judges and
courts with the principles in these areas that the academic profession views as
correct," but that is quite a different approach. And the 1958 Statement on Pro-
cedural Standards, in commenting on the vital matter of procedure in a hearing,
notes that "Unless special circumstances warrant, it should not be necessary to
follow formal rules of court procedure."9
It would probably be correct to say that academic due process has evolved its
own recognizable optimum-less of the certainty which derives from constitutional,
statutory, or other legal guarantees, and more of the flexibility in approach which
leads to a desired academic solution. As Walter Gellhorn notes:"0 "I prefer a much
freer approach to what is in the end a search for the best possible procedures to be
utilized in the academic world. 'Due process' always speaks in terms of the
minimum necessities, whereas our concern is with the best."
3. Academic due process shares with its master, academic freedom, the special
capacity of making an important contribution to all who are involved. By its fair-
ness, it seeks to protect not only the career of the individual but also the reputation
of the institution. It offers the public some assurance that hasty or unprincipled
action will not find it easy to wash down the drain the heavy investment by society
in the powers of a costly expert.
4. Lastly, academic due process is able to teach something important about the
nature of learning itself, because its action is so much like that which created the
5 CLARK BysE & LOUIS JOUGIIIN, TENURE IN AmERCAN HIGHER EDUCTION (1959). The sections on the
law, understandably, are more concerned with dismissal actions.
7Maguire, book review, 47 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 270 (i96i).
'Carr, Report of Committee 4, 1958-59, 45 id. 392 (r959).
9 44 id. 270, 273 (i958).
'
0 Letter from Professor Walter Gellhorn to the author, Feb. 21, 3963.
578 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
educational treasury it guards. Academic due process is a precision instrument; it
has a specific applicability or jurisdiction; it operates by established rules; it concerns
itself with testable facts, and tests them. It is a demonstration of the human intellect
at work, submitting tentative conclusions to comparison with controls (through
the consideration of evidence) and, while moving forward with a particular pro-
ceeding, it tests its own working hypotheses by constant reference to the burden of
proof. A full-scale application of academic due process demonstrates powerfully
the nature and use of the scholarly mind.
II
SYsTEMATIC ANALYSIS
In the pages that follow, the analysis will move forward from point to point
in the procedural management of a disputed decision by the administration of a
college or university to dismiss a teacher from his post for cause. At each point there
will be brought together the main contributions of the five policy statements" which
have been referred to, and a variety of related case material. Of course, no single
actual controversy would be likely to involve every procedural matter here discussed.
i. Informal Conciliation. This first phase of a situation which may become a
"case" is likely to bring a startled or unprepared faculty member face to face with
the more or less firm determination of an administration to carry out a decision
to dismiss him. There is present an ill-defined mixture of information, fear, in-
clination, resolution and opposition; in short, all the jumbled ingredients of a human
dispute at that early stage where the adversary positions have not been occupied
or even clearly perceived. In one case, a teacher may reasonably expect, and in fact
discover, that his administration is willing to talk with him in a fair way, or that
the administration is even willing to be convinced that it has seen things in the
wrong light. Here lies the opportunity for genuine informal conciliation. But
in another case, it is possible that the same early external aspects of the matter will
in fact conceal an irreversible determination to achieve dismissal at any cost; here
lies the danger for the possibly ignorant defendant.
But the effort at informal conciliation should be made; even a victim whose
sacrifice has been determined upon may achieve a favorable tactical position by the
very fact of his demonstrated early innocence. And certainly society is due the
effort.
It is therefore especially desirable that the administrative authorities and the teacher
(accompanied by an adviser) sit down together in a conciliatory session, confronting the
charges and the evidence squarely, and sincerely attempting a solution of their common
problems. A statement of the facts may clarify the situation; exposition of the teacher's
"
1 Among the AAUP documents, the 1915 and 1925 statements have only historical status, having
been superseded as policy by the 1940 Statement of Principles, The 1958 Procedural Standards are
"presented . . . as a guide" but "are not intended to establish a norm in the same manner as the 1940
Statement of Principles." The 1954 ACLU Academic Due Process is an official policy statement of
that organization.
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point of view may persuade an administration not to review his competence and integrity;
exposition of the administration's point of view may persuade a teacher to recognize his
duty to cooperate with his institution, and to indicate how he may do so without sacrifice
of principle. Any one of these developments, or all of them together, may yield a solution
if the participants in the discussion are moved by genuine good will 2
When reason arises to question the fitness of a college or university faculty member
who has tenure or whose term appointment has not expired, the appropriate administrative
officers should ordinarily discuss the matter with him in personal conference. The
matter may be terminated by mutual consent at this point....za
Such a conference must, of course, be in good faith. In the University of Nevada-
Richardson case, five professors were charged with being members of "a small
dissatisfied group"; a request for clarification brought from the president only this:14
"My letter of March 31 states all I have to say on the matter. The [half-hour] period
[before the governing board] from - to - is granted to you to explain your
position." A peremptory notice of this kind is hardly suggestive of conciliation.
In the recent George Washington University-Reichard case, seven members
of the department and two deans met with the teacher in an extended session where
an attempt was made to determine his opinion on certain matters. It is possible
to regard this meeting as in some degree aimed at conciliation, even though the
occasion was formalized by the making of a stenographic record. But procedural
problems of a more serious nature almost at once developed and conciliation was
clearly no longer a main interestY5
Even though the lines of opposition may not yet be clearly drawn in this con-
ciliatory phase, and consequently controlling procedures are likely to be minimal, two
special cautions should be remembered.
First, care should be taken lest the exploration of conciliation yield information
or argument which will be embodied in later formal charges against the faculty
member. In an actual case of the mid-fifties, conversation regarding possible past
communist involvement disclosed the teacher to be a religious agnostic; that fact
then became fixed in the mind of the governing board as an element of disqualifica-
tion. One is tempted to recommend that nothing disclosed in a conciliatory session
should be introduced in a disciplinary proceeding. But what if the revelation concerns
the very heart of the educational process-let us say, attempted indoctrination of
students by the teacher. Can an institution of higher learning ignore evidence clearly
raising grave doubts about fitness to teach students? One possible principle would be
to limit the use of the new knowledge to serve as an indicator of the direction in
which the administration could seek independent evidence, but not to allow the
disclosures of the conciliatory session to be used as evidence.
The second caution relates to suspension. The American Association of Univer-
'= AcADSmc DUE PROcEss 4-5 (1954).
' Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, 44 A.A.U.P. BuL.. 272
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Statement on Procedural Standards].
it 42 id. 534 (1956).
15 48 id. 240, 242 (1962).
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sity Professors states that suspension "is justified only if immediate harm to himself
or others is threatened by his continuance."'" This is an important point because
the entire later proceedings may be colored by implications of the act of suspension,
or by the language used. That was certainly true in the New York University-
Burgum case,'7 and in the very recent University of Illinois-Koch case.' Perhaps
an extreme of impropriety and denial of academic due process occurred in the
Dickinson College-LaVallee case where suspension was first announced in open
faculty meeting.'9 The AAUP position cannot be emphasized too strongly: sus-
pension as an act necessary to prevent harm must surely seldom be unavoidable;
suspension for any other reason profoundly affects, at least in the public mind, the
placing of the burden of proof.
2. Procedure Preliminary to a Hearing or Preliminary Proceedings Concerning
the Fitness of a Faculty Member; Commencement of Formal Proceedings. The
differences between the treatment of this phase by the ACLU and the AAUP are
significant and merit attention.
Academic Due Process asks the administration to present the teacher with "a
statement meeting the demands of the principle of confrontation." It should embody:
a. Relevant legislation, board or trustee by-laws and rulings, administrative
rulings, faculty legislation, and so forth.
b. The charges in the particular case.
c. A summary of the evidence upon which the charges are based, and a first list
of witnesses to be called.
d. The procedure to be followed, including a statement of the nature of the
hearing body.
e. A formal invitation to attend with adviser or counsel 20
The ACLU statement then goes on to suggest that the teacher also bears responsi-
bility at this stage of the proceedings. He may supplement the statement of govern-
ing rules applicable to the situation, or suggest modifications in the charges or
proposed procedure. He should indicate the evidence by which he expects to refute
the charges and should furnish a first list of witnesses he desires to call. Then,
finally, administration and teacher "should, as completely as possible . .. arrive at
agreement on formulation of charges, governing rules, and procedure." Such agree-
ment "will clarify the issues and make unnecessary at the hearing, or upon appeal,
argument as to the form of the controversy, thereby permitting full attention to
be given to matters of substance."'
The Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings calls
"
6 Statement on Procedural Standards 272.
1t 44 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 38 (1958).
19 49 id. 28 (1963).
1944 id. 140 (1958).
20 ACADEmzc DUE PRocess 5.
21 Ibid.
AcDmic DUE PROCESS
for the teacher's being informed of the applicable procedural regulations, but does
not require the providing of other relevant regulations and governing principles and
standards; it calls for written charges, and for formal invitation to attend. The
Association document does not refer to a summary of the evidence to be presented,
or the first list of witnesses, which obligations in the ACLU statement rest upon both
administration and teacher.
A most significant element in the Association Statement reads as follows.92
•.. if an adjustment does not result, a standing or ad hoc committee elected by the
faculty and charged with the function of rendering confidential advice in such situations
should informally inquire into the situation, to effect an adjustment if possible and, if none
is effected, to determine whether in its view formal proceedings to consider his dismissal
should be instituted.
A doubt arises whether a committee so charged may not have dual functions which
are essentially incompatible. "To effect an adjustment, if possible" calls for a media-
tive and conciliatory spirit; incidentally, the committee so acting may receive confi-
dences and explore compromises. So far so good. But this same committee, failing
in mediation or conciliation, also finds itself charged with the duty of a grand jury-
to determine whether a hearing on dismissal should occur. In one unreported case
(where, however, this aspect of the situation became public knowledge), a committee
so dually charged in a forced retirement situation strongly protested to the administra-
tion against the nature of its mixed duty; in fact, it felt uncertain whether it was on
one side or the other, or in the middle. It would seem desirable to clarify this matter
as soon as possible, perhaps by recommending the separation of functions and their
assignment to different groups. Mediation and indictment do not belong together.
The 194 o Statement of Principles does not touch on these preliminary matters,
but the silence may accurately be characterized as one of economy, and the pro-
cedural requirements listed for the actual hearing dearly assume good procedure
in the preliminary stages. The 1915 Declaration of Principles, interestingly, twice
mentions the standard of "grounds .. .formulated with reasonable definiteness"
and "charges . . . in specific terms."23  This standard was "lost" until the 1954
Academic Due Process where it is loosely embodied and the 1958 Statement on
Procedural Standards where it emerges clearly as "a statement with reasonable
particularity of the grounds proposed for the dismissal."
In the Catawba College cases of 1952, orderly development of the administration's
view that one or more dismissals were required was adversely affected by the self-
constitution and meetings of an alumni "Fact-Finding Committee" to examine the
causes of student unrest. At the time institutional controversy was going on, this
committee came up with a report to the Board of Trustees which included the view
that "a few disgruntled professors, who had personal grievances against the college
2 Statement on Procedural Standards 272.
23 19i15 Declaration of Principles, 40 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 1i1 (1954).
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... took advantage of this confused situation in an attempt to discredit the admin-
istration and the trustees." '24 Such an intrusion, and it was given weight, proved
most harmful to the professors involved in the Catawba College cases.
3. An Interim Matter; the Psychological Bridge. Somewhere in the two phases
so far examined, the period of informal conciliation and the period of preliminary
proceedings, one discovers that the usual academic case has developed the recog-
nizable characteristics of an adversary proceeding. The customary benevolent and
fraternal exchanges of campus life become infrequent or terminate abruptly; con-
versation with those not on one's side becomes guarded, lest advantage be lost
or vulnerability disclosed; in talking with one's supporters thought tends to be
given to tactics and strategy. The teacher is advised that:2"
Communications, as a general rule, should be in writing, with copies retained. Oral dis-
cussion should be followed by an exchange of memoranda indicating the understanding
which each party has of the conversation.
Unusual problems may arise. In the Fisk University-Lorch case, the probable
cause which had so deeply disturbed the president as to result in confused and
unwise action on his part, was thrust aside when the teacher appeared before the
board-and a new cause of action was announced by that body20 In the Princeton
Theological Seminary-Theron case, it was difficult to establish the nature of some
of the points to be examined because the teacher had never received any kind of
written appointment during his ten years of service.27 By contrast, in the Allen
University cases, the teachers in due course discovered that the administration had in
its possession, and may even have assembled, elaborate dossiers on non-academic
aspects of their lives2
The faculty member, in the whole time before the receiving of formal charges,
is subject to hazards known and unknown. Therefore, not the least difficult of his
choices will be that of a psychology for the situation; (i) friendly, freely communica-
tive, and open to adjustment, or (2) advisedly self-protective, communicative only
in formalities fit for a record, and rejective of overtures which have not been
approved by counsel.
4. Counsel. It is of considerable historical import that neither the 1915 Declaration
of Principles nor the 1925 Conference Statement states that a teacher may be assisted
by counsel. It is not until 194o that the Association says:29 "He should be permitted
to have with him an adviser of his own choosing who may act as counsel." Eighteen
years later, in the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards, it is said that the func-
tions of this counsel should be similar to those of a representative of the president
21 43 id. 210, 214-15 (1957).
25 AcAD ic DuE PRocoss 5-6.
26 45 A.A.U.P. BULL. 27, 36-37 (959).
27 45 id. 50-51 (1959).2 8 4 6 id. 89 (i96O).
so 1940 Statement of Principles ioq.
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who will "assist in developing the case."3  These provisions cover the ground, at
least by implication. However, the ACLU Academic Due Process takes into account
two other kinds of unfortunate situations: (i) those where academic advice proved
insufficient, and the lack of legal counsel permitted injury to the teacher, and (2)
those unhappy cases where the ignorance of a lawyer adviser about academic pro-
cedures led to failure in seizing upon possible academic solutions to the case.
Consequently, the ACLU statement recommends :31
The teacher should select from among his colleagues a person of established position,
wisdom, and judicial temper, who will act as his official academic adviser, or should select
counsel to advise him on legal matters. He may, in his discretion, be assisted by both an
academic adviser and a legal counselor. The teacher should inform the administration of
the identity of his adviser or counsel and should obtain written agreement to his appearance
on the teacher's behalf.
Generally speaking, institutions have permitted a teacher to have counsel, al-
though some faculty members have had to go outside their own institutions for
help, and a few have failed to provide themselves through ignorance of their own
need. Generally, counsel has been helpful, although there have been instances of a
legalistic attitude (chiefly by nonlawyer counsel) which has irritated a hearing
committee.
However, two main problems raised by the presence of counsel are of a broader
nature than the question of choice or the degree of receptivity of the administration.
First of all, it is undeniable that the presence of some kind of counsel means that
now, for sure, there are adversaries present, and this may affect the further develop-
ment of the situation. Significantly, in terms of its experience, the ACLU, on balance,
recommends that the adviser be present even in the period of informal conciliation.
In short, anyone, from the start, is in danger.
The second problem results from the extremely limited supply of adequate legal
counsel. Many practicing attorneys confronted by a dismissal case will find them-
selves for the first time dealing professionally with the customs and principles of
academic life. Conversely, few academic advisers will feel themselves competent to
assist the faculty member, when there is likelihood that legal issues will develop, and
the president or board is assisted by the college or university legal adviser. These
deficiencies suggest why law professors, who know both law and Academia, are
often drawn into academic trials. If this demand is unavoidable, possibly the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools could at least contribute to a solution of the supply
problem by developing and organizing a pool of legal professorial talent, so that
the maximum of help might be had without allowing too heavy a burden to fall
upon those law professors who have become known for their willingness to help
and, consequently, are sought out more often than is fair to them.
One further caution is necessary about the influence which the presence of legal
00 Statement on Procedural Standards 273.
' AcADEc DuC PRocESS 5.
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counsel may have on a hearing. Probably, the University of Vermont-Novikoff case
became involved in legal tangles mainly because of complicated and confusing pro-
cedures. But an important contributory cause was the participation of an attorney,
for the administration, who is reported to have played "the role of a determined
prosecutor"; it is difficult to imagine how to meet such a challenge except by response
of the same partisan sortf2
5. The Constitution and Creation of the Hearing Committee. The demand of
the 1915 Declaration of Principles for "suitable judicial bodies," i.e., "a special or
permanent judicial committee chosen by the faculty senate or council, or by the
faculty at large," established the idea of the hearing by expert colleagues at the
outset. The demand has been repeated with varying degrees of clarity and force
by the succeeding Association statements. The 1940 Statement of Principles, like the
1925 Conference Statement, merely requires that the issue should "be considered by
both a faculty committee and the governing board of the institution"; nothing is
said of the formal relationship or cooperative practice of these two groups, or the
manner of selection of the faculty committee. This curious gap in statement of
fundamental procedure is partly filled by the language found in the Statement on
Procedural Standards, which calls for:
. .. an elected standing committee not previously concerned with the case or a committee
established as soon as possible after the president's letter to the faculty member has been
sent. The choice of members of the hearing committee should be on the basis of their
objectivity and competence and of the regard in which they are held in the academic
community.
The ACLU statement reads :4
The hearing committee should be a standing or special group of full-time teaching
colleagues, democratically chosen by and representative of the teaching staff, and selected
by pre-established rules. The administration should dissociate itself from those performing
a judicial function at the hearing.
The difficulty is simple and ominous; plainly many institutions do not grant a
hearing before a faculty committee. Of the forty-six cases reported in the AAUP
Bulletin since 1948,"5 only fourteen have been adjudicated by a committee wholly or
substantially faculty in composition; of the fourteen cases reported since 1958,
only one has witnessed a faculty committee hearing with genuine judicial authority
for the group-and in that one case the governing board set aside the unanimous
faculty judgment calling for reprimand, and dismissed the teacher. The picture is
not totally black: some board committees or administrative hearing bodies have
rendered verdicts which appear to be just, and, of course, there have been cases in
82 44 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 11-21 (1958).
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brought by a teacher against a defendant institution.
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which faculty committees have judged, and been sustained, and which are un-
reported. But the general scene is certainly somber; there is only weak indication
that the run-of-the-mill dismissal action will have in its history the one absolute
essential for assurance that the faculty of an institution is charged with governing
its own status and membership. Those who will admit subjective impressions may
take consolation in the fact that the "better" institutions usually come through, and
that the failure to use the faculty hearing committee procedure is more prevalent at
places which are undeveloped or are under despotic rule.
A main question has always been the makeup of the faculty hearing committee.
Ideally it should be all-faculty, and faculty-elected; not because of the greater wisdom
of the faculty but because a faculty point of view and judgment is needed, by itself
and untinged by the proper but different context and value system which the govern-
ing board may, in its wisdom, apply. At Catawba College the committee was made
up of five trustees and five faculty members appointed by the president of the
Board.30 At the University of Kansas City the committee included five board
members, the president, three deans, and five elected faculty members0 7 At North
Dakota Agricultural College the committee consisted of eleven administrative officers,
and two elected faculty members-one a division chief and the other a candidate for
a deanship38 Such weird combinations tell us nothing conclusive about a particular
judgment or the judicial capacity of the persons serving on these committees. They
do, however, suggest that some one, some time, was afraid to hear a straight faculty
opinion.
On the question of closed or private hearings, the AAUP statements of 1915, 1925,
and 194o, and the ACLU statement of 1954 are silent. The 1958 Statement on
Procedural Standards advises that the hearing committee, "in consultation with the
president and the faculty member, should exercise its judgment as to whether the
hearing should be public or private." 9 Another view is that the hearing should be
private unless the faculty member requests otherwise4
A strong argument can be made for placing the decision about an open or
closed hearing in the hands of the faculty member. His professional life, perhaps
the whole future for himself and his family, may be at stake; these are great concerns
and outweigh any consideration of possible embarrassment or pain to a witness.
Should the committee be standing or ad hoc? The specially selected committee
may make it possible to bring into play the judgment of particularly qualified persons
for a particular situation; the standing committee has the advantage of being chosen
by a sober assessment of the judicial disposition of its members, not in a time of
crisis. Should the committee be appointed or elected? Either may do quite well,
provided that it is the faculty or its agent which acts. No one can regard as fair the36 43 A.A.U.P. BULL. 2,x7-18 (1957).
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appointment of a faculty hearing committee by the administration which is to
present the charges; it is essential that "the administration . . . dissociate itself
from those performing a judicial function at the hearing."41
One procedural question is raised rather often, by obvious analogy with the law:
What about challenges? Challenges for cause should certainly be permitted at any
appropriate point, even at the end; the judgment in the New York University-
Burgum case would have been better based if a member of the committee had not
missed eleven of the eleven hearing sessions and two of the four deliberative sessions;
this person did not disqualify himself and probably could not be challenged.42
Challenge for known involvement or prejudice needs no discussion. With respect
to peremptory challenges, the difficulty is that they may raise procedural problems
regarding replacement, especially in a small institution. Perhaps the best working
rule is to permit a wide latitude of challenge, without too much specificity as to
criteria of unsuitability, and then to leave the decision, and the consequences of the
decision, to the hearing committee itself.
43
In any event, the members of the hearing committee should be "individuals of
known independence and objectivity," and in support of these qualifications it is
desirable that they have tenure 4
6. The Charges. Charges are so generally important for all human controversy
and so essential to any judicial proceeding that one can well understand why it has
not seemed necessary to provide an elaborate analysis of their function or nature
in the several formulations of academic due process. The 1915 AAUP statement
refers to "grounds which will be regarded as justifying... dismissal... [and they]
should be formulated with reasonable definiteness ... stated in writing in specific
terms."4 The silence of x925 is succeeded by the 194o requirement that "the accused
teacher should have been informed before the hearing in writing of the charges
against him. '4  In the AAUP series 1958 returns full circle to 1915 and asks for
written, particular charges4
Academic Due Process of the ACLU calls for a good deal more. In addition
to the charges themselves, there is to be an accompanying summary of the evidence
upon which the charges are based and a first list of witnesses to be called. To make
possible the best kind of defense the charges are to be accompanied by a full state-
ment of the regulations pertinent to the issue and a description of the procedures to
be followed s These further related elements to the central fact of charges were
not brought in by the ACLU to increase resort to something like legal forms.
'
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On the contrary, it was felt that this full display of "the case" might lessen the game
of attack and defense and help prepare for unimpassioned consideration the main
points in dispute.
In the face of a principle so simple and fundamental as that which calls for
charges, it is something of a shock to observe the frequent and gross failure of
American administrations in higher education to provide this elementary device for
achieving justice. In the Rutgers University-Fifth Amendment cases a Board of
Review undertook to examine the matter in great detail, even though there were no
charges before it, and even though agreement had been reached with the administra-
ton that charges would be made after the Board of Review report. But this
apparently seemed slow business for an impatient governing board; the professors
were given short notice to answer a congressional committee or be dismissed 9 At
Rutgers, dismissal preceded the promised charges, and that would seem to be as
anticipatory as it is possible to be.
At Fisk University there were no charges until the faculty member faced his
governing board, and then, vague as they were, they did not clearly relate to the
objections the administration had been raising.50 Charges were absent in the
Southern California-Deinum case, and the AAUP investigating committee succinctly
remarked that "there cannot be a determination that the facts are not in dispute
unless there is first a determination of charges that enables the faculty member to
determine what facts are alleged."51 At the University of Nevada all five teachers
received blanket charges of a very general nature; only the supreme court of the
state rescued the men, by an order for a bill of particulars-and rescued them a second
time when it threw out new charges not mentioned in the bill of particulars.52 In
the recent Arkansas State Teachers College-Higgins case, repeated requests for
charges met no response;53 and the report of the investigating committee makes
clear that only three likely interpretations seem possible in such situations: (i)
there are no charges which can be made, (2) charges if made would be irrelevant
to the academic context, or (3) the charges if made would be proved false.
Other variations include the Catawba College type of broadside, so ample as to
fail in particularity: disloyalty to the administration, incitement of unrest and
suspicion, and failure to support the administration and the objectives of the
college 4
At New York University in the Bradley case, a clear enough charge derived from
conviction of contempt of Congress, but as the institutional proceedings went on the
charge became the different matter of identification with the Communist Party. 5
49 42 A.A.U.P. BULL. 77-78 (1956).
IO 45 id. 36, 42 (1959)-
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In the University of Michigan-Nickerson and Davis cases, a faculty hearing com-
mittee did all its work with witnesses and defendants and documents without making
any real effort to extract from the material before it charges "set forth with reason-
able particularity." Then, in its report, it made an "Analysis of Charges." 0
An amorphous but genuine problem arises from the 1958 Statement on Procedural
Standards recommendation that the faculty member, after receiving from the admin-
istration the charges and relevant regulations, "should answer in writing, not less
than one week before the date set for the hearing, the statements in the president's
letter [which presents the charges]."" If this requirement means no more than
(i) a duty to acknowledge the receiving of the charges, or (2) acceptance of those
charges which are true, or (3) response by a general denial, or (4) response by a
demurrer, or (5) a summarizing of the defense evidence to be presented, or (6) a
presenting of a first list of witnesses-then no harm should come. But the faculty
member must not, under any circumstances, feel constrained to state, in advance of
his formal hearing, any part of his reasoned defense if he feels that by doing so he
might prejudice his position at the hearing itself.
In the dangerously undefinable proceedings of the George Washington Univer-
sity-Reichard case, counsel for the teacher asked for charges and standards; he was
told he might submit a memorandum. Later the administration asserted that the
teacher involved knew full well the nature of the University's concern; but the
professor involved said he did not know. As the investigating committee said in its
report:58 "It appears . . . unsatisfactory that a man should be tried for shortcomings
(a) which are alleged by the University authorities to be understood by all parties,
and (b) which the University authorities are unwilling to state."
In the light of the record, it may correctly be said that the single most
prevalent defection from academic due process is in the absence of charges, or charges
of such distorted, vague, or shifting quality that no proper defense can be made.
The answer, of course, is not far to seek. Not many cases involve failures in profes-
sional responsibility or gross misbehavior of the kind which permit specific charges.
The usual offense is to arouse the sensitivities and angers of the community and the
fears of the administration; and in such a situation a formulation of specific charges
would also disclose the standards which administrations apply to such dismissal cases.
7. Governing Standards and Procedures. There is great variation in the fullness
and precision of the statements under which different institutions conduct their
dismissal proceedings. Some colleges and universities which offer little by way of
stated fair rules and genuine academic standards are deficient in this area of academic
law simply because no case has arisen to require statement of principles and
machinery. However, in other institutions the standards and procedures are weak
or non-existent because of unwillingness to confront the possibility of an unpleasant
44 id. 68 (1958).
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affair. It is in such institutions that the AAUP discovers a most difficult task; it is
not easy to persuade an angry and determined institution to take pause to discover
whether it has proper criteria and procedure for the hot business in hand. At these
colleges and universities lies a strong challenge to the fraternal sense of faculty mem-
bers; they are perhaps the only group which at a point of crisis can with much hope
press for a well-grounded and well-ordered trial of a professor.
An interesting way of handling the rules was established by the Board of Trustees
of the Lowell Institute of Technology when in the Snitzer and Fine cases it ruled
at the outset that 9
. . . all questions relating to the propriety of any interrogation or argument shall be
determined by the Chairman or, at his request, by an Assistant Attorney General [who was
conducting the case against the teachers], and any such determination shall be final unless
the Trustees vote otherwise .... Any of the foregoing rules may be modified, or waived
during the session, by vote of the Trustees.
8. The Evidence. The unusual fact that an academic controversy has developed
into an adversary hearing requires at least these general warnings:
First, even if the institution is very large, the quarrel is a kind of family affair;
and most of those participating will have to live with each other in the near and
distant future. For this reason one may at times discover a tendency to substitute
for academic due process a way of handling matters which might be called "domestic
due process"--a kinder or a harsher system, but of doubtful appropriateness.
Second, the infrequency of cases at most institutions means that when a dis-
missal question arises there will come into play seldom-used machinery which may
creak noticeably. The innumerable safeguards which the law daily applies to the
handling of evidence in courts are hardly matched by academic due process which
is "occasional" in application and infinitely less comprehensive in detail. Never--
theless, "the law protects," and since a dismissal proceeding is likely to call for all
the protection available, some borrowing from the law's way of doing things is.
both likely and desirable.
Parenthetically, one may note that there is a transcendent principle which can
solve many procedural problems, even for the inexperienced. The principle is that
of fairness. Under that aegis, difficult questions of procedural management may
disappear or at least assume determinable form.
(a) Presence. All the policy statements imply, and several state, that the person
involved shall be at the hearing during the presentation of evidence. (It appears
to be common practice for the parties to withdraw when the hearing committee
goes into executive session for purposes of deliberation and judgment.) There have
not been many cases raising the issue of the right to be present at one's own trial,
but there is at least one extraordinary example. In the 1958 South Dakota State
College-Worzella case the governing board considered the report of an administrator
3 45 id. 561 (1959).
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who, in resigning, attacked a number of persons, including Professor Worzella;
the teacher was not asked to comment on the report, and did not know that it would
be considered as a basis for a determination regarding his dismissal. He was not
present and was not heard, nor was the president of the institution; there was, of
course, no opportunity to cross-examine or to submit testimony."0
(b) Confrontation. "The principle embodied in the legal concept of confronta-
tion should govern academic due process. The teacher should be informed of all
the charges and all the evidence against him; he should have full opportunity to
deny, to refute, and to rebut."'" The AAUP statements display a puzzling oscilla-
tion: that of 1915 does not mention confrontation, although the spirit of the prin-
ciple is present; 1925 holds that the teacher has the right to "face his accusers";
i94o says nothing on this point; and 1958 reads: "The faculty member should have
the opportunity to be confronted by all witnesses adverse to him." 2 The issue arises
.at times in specific instances. The Catawba College cases disclose the teachers
.appearing for their hearing before the board and confronting for the first time a
report by a self-constituted alumni committee which was hostile to them; the faculty
'members were in a seriously handicapped position because they had no way of
'challenging their accusers.63 In the Lowell Technological Institute case, one part of
the over-all denial of due process was the ruling made at the outset that neither the
:president nor any member of the faculty would be available for questioning."'
(c) Witnesses for the Defense. The 1915, 1925, and i94o AAUP statements do
-not specifically state the right of the faculty member generally to present witnesses
in support of his position; but they do state his right to do so in a designated way
-on the particular issue of competence-and there is no indication that this right in
.a limited area is not part of a harmonious whole. The statements are deficient in
letter but not in spirit. The ACLU 1954 Academic Due Process says: "Both the
-teacher and the administration should have the right to present and examine wit-
nesses and to cross-examine witnesses. The administration should make available
to the teacher such authority as it may possess to require the presence of witnesses."
'The 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards says nothing about the larger problem
'of presenting witnesses, but proceeds to the next step-subpoena power-which
permits our assuming existence of the main right.6 5
The Reed College-Moore case reveals a member of the faculty being examined
an a dismissal proceeding, who was denied the aid of the college when he sought
'to have appear as witnesses the president and a former college oflicial in order that
he might question them about their knowledge of him at the time he was appointed,
and later. The AAUP investigating commitee regarded this denial as vital to the
60 47 id. 253 (i96i).
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determination of facts and a violation of academic due process, but also came to the
conclusion that the evidence which would have been obtained would have been
merely cumulative and that the denial did not therefore fatally affect the proceed-
ings.0  This view can be challenged. It is one thing to hold that a particular
element of evidence which has been submitted is in fact cumulative; but there is
an element of unauthorized prophecy in a conclusion that what would have been
heard would have been of such and such a character or weight.
(d) Expert Witnesses. In x915 the writers of the Declaration of Principles must
have assumed that charges of incompetence would be the issue from time to time.
They wrote: 7
S.. if the charge is one of professional incompetency, a formal report upon his work
should be first made in writing by the teachers of his own department and of cognate
departments in the university, and, if the teacher concerned so desires, by a committee
of his fellow-specialists from other institutions, appointed by some competent authority.
As a matter of fact, the issue of competence has seldom been in dispute in
reported cases, although it may be suspected to have existed in a number of situa-
tions which were resolved one way or another without public notice. In the very
recent Grove City College-Gara case, the administration alleged incompetence; but
since nothing remotely resembling a trial of the issue ever took place, the AAUP
investigating committee felt obliged to report on this matter in a statement supple-
mentary to their main report on the denial of academic due process.0 8
(e) Cross-Examination. The earliest AAUP statement, in 1915, refers to a "fair
trial"; this may carry with it the idea of cross-examination. The 1925 Conference
Statement states that the teacher "should always have the opportunity to face his
accusers." 194o is weaker and requires that cross-examination be read into the
phrase "heard in his own defense," if it is to be found at all. 1958 reads: "The
faculty member or his counsel and the representative designated by the president
should have the right, within reasonable limits, to question all witnesses who
testify orally." 69 Academic Due Process plainly sets forth, for both parties, the right
to "present," to "examine," and to "cross-examine."
The cases which raise a question of the right to cross-examine are not numerous,
but the importance of the issue may be seen in those at North Dakota Agricultural
College where cross-examination revealed the nature of much unsatisfactory evi-
dence; evidence so poor in quality that the AAUP investigating committee char-
acterized it as "in large measure hearsay, rumor, opinion, innuendo, and irrelevancies,
most of which would not have been admitted over objection in a properly conducted
court of law."7
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It would be interesting to determine, if any standards existed for an opinion,
whether the placing of witnesses under oath could be regarded as a kind of pro-
tection, akin to the right of cross-examination. The case record on this point is
thin, but one can probably assume that sworn testimony will occur more frequently
where public boards are concerned.7 '
(f) The Hearing Committee Acting on Its Own Authority. The 1958 Statement
on Procedural Standards explicitly states what may have been understood for a long
time but is here first set down-the power of the committee to control the proceedings
in the interest of justice: "The committee should determine the order of proof,
should normally conduct the questioning of witnesses, and, if necessary, should
secure the presentation of evidence important to the case."72 This injunction is new
to the scene, but has great potentiality for strengthening the administration of justice
in academic proceedings. A courageous, intelligent hearing committee could, in
many situations, seek out and hear useful evidence which has not been offered by
the parties. In short, here lies the opportunity for the faculty authority to offer
constructive leadership. For instance, there is always the question whether a fault
has been viewed in the light of all the teacher has been and done, for good or bad.
The investigating committee of the AAUP in the Reed College-Moore case ob-
served :73
At a minimum, academic due process seems to us to require that a faculty member
with tenure is entitled to consideration of factors which might conceivably offset his
possible misconduct of non-cooperation. These factors should include (i) his record
of performance in service in the College, and (2) his motives or reasons for the act of
non-cooperation.
The failure of a committee to control its hearing is unhappily a matter of record.
in two very recent cases. In the Arkansas State College-Higgins case, an adminis-
trator answered for a committee of all the full professors, stating that the function of
the group was "to endorse or not to endorse the decision of the Board of Trustees." In
the George Washington University-Reichard case, the informal hearing committee
appears to have done nothing to correct the failure of "university authorities ... to.
follow the natural and reasonable course of attempting to find supporting evidence for
their position, and ... [to rely] instead merely upon speculation about motives."74
(g) Evidence Exempt from Cross-Examination. The 1958 Statement on Pro-
cedural Standards at one point states that cross-examination is a right "within reason-
able limits"; and, even more fundamentally, confrontation may be denied the faculty
member by the committee. "Where unusual and urgent reasons move the hearing
committee to withhold this right, or where the witness cannot appear, the identity
of the witness, as well as his statements, should nevertheless be disclosed to the
faculty member.175  In sharp contrast the ACLU Academic Due Process states.
42 id. 552 (1956).
• Statement on Procedural Standards 273.
44 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 127 (1958).
7 48 id. 246 (1962).
- Statement on Procedural Standards 273.
ACADEmIC DUE PROCESS 593
that "The principle of confrontation should apply throughout the hearing."70  In
the opinion of the present writer, it is a serious error to permit the exceptions to the
principle of confrontation which are set forth in the Statement on Procedural
Standards. If the history of cases involving academic due process recounted only
the occasional lapses of great institutions, and lapses of small degree, the issue might
be hypothetical. But this is simply not the historical fact. Denials of academic
due process constitute a record of unjust treatment of the worst sort by institutions
who know or care nothing about the principles involved, or, at best, are the story
of serious lapses from grace of institutions which ordinarily behave well. The analogy
is irresistible; one should consider the restrictions placed upon confrontation by the
security agencies of the national defense apparatus' The only conceivable ground
which can safely be yielded here would be with respect to depositions of distant
witnesses under oath, introduced under strict and exact rules as to weight, openness
to challenge, and every other safeguard needed to protect the teacher.
9. Burden of Proof. Academic Due Process states that "it is a fundamental
principle of fairness that charges against a person are to be made the basis of action
only when proven, and that the burden of proof rests upon those who bring them. '7'
There cannot be much question about the operation of this principle in practice
under the several AAUP statements, but for some reason, not apparent, it has never
been written into this series of documents. It is only in the 1956 Academic Freedom
and Tenure in the Quest for National Security, the report of a special committee,
that one can read: "The burden of proof should rest upon the administrative officer
bringing the charge, and should not be placed upon the faculty member... -"' The
authors of Tenure in American Higher Education state that the appropriate ".... ad-
ministrative official should have the burden of proving the charges by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence."80
The cases which present a question of burden of proof are numerous and serious.
At the University of Nevada, in the Richardson case, the administration ordered the
faculty member to "show cause" why he should be continued in his post.8' At New
York University, in the Burgum case, the teacher was suspended and then allowed
to appeal to a board of review the adverse action taken against him; 2 this unjust
procedure has fortunately been completely eliminated in a recent revision of the
New York University regulations. The Board of Trustees of Lowell Technological
Institute informed the teachers that the hearing to be given them was for "the
purpose of reviewing the provisional appointment . . . [and whether they] should
SAcADEMIc DUE PRoCEss 6.
SJoughin, Scrutiny of Professors: Impact and Modification of Section 6-i (old 7-e) of the Industrial
Security Manual, 44 A.A.U.P. BULL. i99 (1958).
1 8 ACADEmiC DuE PROCEss 4-
42 A.A.U.P. BULL. 6o (1956).8 CLARx BYSE & Louis JOUGHIN, TENURE IN AmERcAN HIGmE EDUCATION 149 (1959)-
81 42 A.A.U.P. BULL. 554 (1956).
82 44 id. 50 (1958).
594 LAw AND CONEMPORARY PROBLEMS
be dismissed."'  The President of the Board of Regents of Texas State Teachers
College in a recent so-called hearing said to the counsel for a teacher: "Our Board
is concerned with what you as a representative might say and what [the teacher's]
... reasons are for this Board to employ him." 4
One difficult problem with respect to burden of proof, which has not been really
solved, is that of the teacher in probationary status-that is, not yet having achieved
tenure-who claims that his notice of non-renewal of appointment involves an
academic freedom issue. The AAUP offers as policy a statement that "during the
probationary period a teacher should have the academic freedom that all other
members of the faculty have." 5 The principle, of course, is obvious and good, but
further guidance may be needed. In fact, it is only fair to the teacher in probationary
status that he be told the burden of proof is upon him in most instances. The
ACLU statement offers the following approach:"8
American educational practice permits great fluidity in the testing of teachers as to
their permanent usefulness in a particular institution. This experimental phase of a
teacher's career is wisely characterized by a minimum of formal judgment; teachers
come and go without recorded praise or blame. Furthermore, non-tenure appointments
often fall within the marginal area of an institution's educational and financial program;
the dropping of a teacher may have no bearing whatsoever upon his professional capacity.
But, although non-retention does not necessarily raise an academic freedom issue, such an
issue may be present in non-retention. For example, improper consideration may have
been given to non-academic matters, such as a teacher's race, or his religious or political
beliefs and associations. Such improper consideration is a violation of academic freedom
and the non-tenure teacher is entitled to all the protections of academic due process....
Action in non-tenure academic freedom cases should take this general form:
i. If the non-tenure teacher believes that improper considerations have unmistakably
affected the decision not to retain him, he should, with appropriate advice, determine
whether he can assemble adequate proof in support of his contention.
2. The teacher should decide whether he is willing to hazard the possible disclosure
of professional weaknesses he may have displayed at an early point in his career.
3- If his decisions under "" and "2" are positive, he should request an opportunity
for informal conciliation as set forth ... above.
4- If such informal conciliation is denied, or unsuccessful, he should then request a
formal hearing, and submit a written waiver of the traditional right of non-tenure teachers
to non-disclosure of the grounds upon which they have been released.
5. The administration should then grant to the teacher the entire procedure for adjudi-
cation [available to tenure teachers.]
The advantage of this approach is that, in addition to being offered procedural
guidance, the teacher is himself given the responsibility of making his case and
abiding by the results. This would seem to be the only kind of a rule which, in the
last analysis, can offer full opportunity for adjudication.
as 45 id. 561 (1959)-
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Io. Findings and Conclusions. For unexplored reasons, the 1915, 1925, and 1940
AAUP statements say nothing about the findings and conclusions which the hearing
committee should offer. The 1954 ACLU statement says that "the full text of the
findings and conclusions of the hearing committee should be made available in
identical form and at the same time to the administration and the teacher."' 7  A
much stronger rule is that of the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards which
asks that the hearing committee "make explicit findings with respect to each of the
grounds of removal presented, and a reasoned opinion may be desirable.""8 Here,
it seems the American Association of University Professors is moving toward a
norm much like that established by the practice of the courts to render a decision on
the facts and a statement on the law when present and future justice will be
served thereby. The need for the norm is understandable when one considers
the cases.
In one of the University of Michigan cases, where communism was the issue, the
AAUP investigating committee noted that "no finding of Communist Party mem-
bership, innocent or otherwise, or of illegal or immoral activities, was supported by
substantial evidence in the record."8 9 In the South Dakota State College-Worzella
case, the 1958 judgment of the governing board included a statement that the teacher
had been found to be "the main controversial issue" in events of 1948 to i95i, and
"prior thereto"; these findings were on issues of great complexity, long past, in
which the teacher would by some students of the matter be thought to have been
vindicated, and in any event the issues had long since been disposed of officially as
closed 9 The governing board of Dickinson College, with twelve items of com-
plaint before it, did not indicate which of these it regarded as proved. 1 The faculty
committee at New York University in the Burgum case submitted several memo-
randa to the trustees; on one main charge, a committee member said the teacher had
lied, a second member said that the teacher's connection with the Communist Party
was proved, and the third member said the teacher was guilty of academic turpi-
tude. 2 Professor Novikoff, in his vicissitudes at the University of Vermont, con-
fronted three charges; in the decision by the Board of Trustees the first charge
was dismissed, the second charge was disregarded, and nothing was said about the
third charge9 In the North Dakota Agricultural College cases, the Advisory Com-
mittee sent no written report to the governing board, and consequently a decision
was made only upon a decision.94 And one of the teachers involved in the Lowell
Technological cases has complained that the adverse verdict of the governing board,
7 1d. at 6.
ss Statement on Procedural Standards 274.
44 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 82 (I958).
o 47 id. 250 (196i).
91 44 id. 142 (1958).
02 44 id. 47 (1958).
"3 44 id. 12 (1958).
9442 id. 147 (956).
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embodying no judgment on the evidence and a dismissal wihout stated reason, has
been harmful to him in his efforts to continue in the profession. 5
The speed with which a hearing committee should act should certainly be as
great as possible, and it should render judgment as quickly as possible." But surely
neither expedition nor delay are in themselves issues of justice; the answer must
always be that the best speed is that which serves justice best in each case.
ii. The Record. Until 1940 the AAUP statements said nothing about the record;
then the injunction is given that a "full stenographic record of the hearing [should
be made available] to the parties concerned."" The 1958 statement, which, of course,
carries with it all of the 1940 statement, adds that "all of the evidence should be duly
recorded" and the president and the faculty member should be "given a copy of the
record of the hearing.""8  The ACLU Academic Due Process notes :" "A full record
should be taken at the hearing; it should be made available in identical form and
at the same time to the hearing group, the administration, and the teacher. The
cost should be met by the institution." Here the requirement of simultaneous presen-
tation would seem to rule out the 1958 AAUP provision for a judgment in advance
of the completion of the record if such speed is fair.
12. Two Special Questions: Time to Prepare, and Waiver of Rights. For all
practical purposes none of the policy statements offer any detailed rules or guidance
with respect to the time that should be allowed for preparation, for study of the
record, and for other chronological questions which might arise; this would seem
to be a wise silence in the light of the great variety of academic situations which
occur in very different kinds of institutions. But some notorious cases exhibit the
need at least for the rule of fairness. Not the worst but perhaps the most con-
spicuous cases were those at the University of Michigan where the findings and
conclusions of a kind of hearing committee were not placed before the faculty mem-
bers involved until immediately before the next and conclusive hearing.100
Waiver is said to present difficult problems even for a fully developed legal
system. The few instances which have occurred in academic controversy have gen-
erally led to the view that a teacher cannot waive rights which have been published
as accruing to the whole profession. An individual may not waive a right for himself
when by so doing he affects the rights of other members of the profession. In the
Long Island University-Post College-Sittler case, where there was prior agreement
to resign, the judgment of the AAUP was that "unless the administration removes
the compulsion which is a necessary consequence of an agreement to resign upon
:r. 45 id-.5.53, 564 (1959).
'
8AcADemic DuF PRoCESS 6 reads: "The hearing committee should promptly and forth-rightly adjudi-
cate the issues." Statement on Procedural Standards 274 reads: "The committee may proceed to decision
promptly, without having a record of the hearing transcribed, if its decision would be aided thereby."
:7 1940 Statement of Principles zo9.
08Statement on Procedural Standards 273-74.
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request, failure to seek a hearing is not the result of an informed and uncoerced
decision to waive the protections of academic due process."1 1
13. Appellate Procedure. It should be understood at the outset that in almost every
academic institution the final authority lies in the hands of the governing board,
either under a charter issued by the state to a private college or university, or by
statutory or constitutional authorization and delegation of power to a public institu-
tion. No statistical count exists to indicate the frequency of appeal by a dissatisfied
teacher or a dissatisfied administration; but it is known that one or the other party,
when ruled against by the hearing committee, rather frequendy concludes the matter
without appeal.
The 1915, 1925, and 1940 statements by the AAUP indicate with increasing clarity
the obvious fact that the ultimate authority in a college or university can be involved
on appeal, and, perhaps, by original jurisdiction. Academic Due Process indicates
that the findings of the faculty hearing committee should be final on matters of
professional competence and integrity1 02
The 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards at this point makes a major contri-
bution to the principles which govern academic due process. It states that:103
If the governing body chooses to review the case, its review should be based on the
record of the previous hearing, accompanied by opportunity for argument, oral or written
or both, by the principals at the hearing or their representatives. The decision of the
hearing committee should either be sustained or the proceeding be returned to the
committee with objections specified. In such a case the committee should reconsider,
taking account of the stated objections and receiving new evidence if necessary. It should
frame its decision and communicate it in the same manner as before. Only after study
of the committee's reconsideration should the governing body make a final decision over-
ruling the committee.
If this rule were to be applied in full force and faith to the adjudication of an
academic controversy such as dismissal action, one might almost be warranted
in regarding academic due process as in effect genuinely established. One would
hope seldom to meet a hearing committee judgment which was a poor or careless job,
since the members of the group would know that, in addition to possible rejection, it
might be referred back with the detailed judgment of a responsible governing board;
conversely, it is difficult to conceive of a governing board indulging in peremptory
or arbitrary decision when it knew that its adverse view would be subjected to the
detailed study and comment of an articulate faculty committee. Two powerful
voices responsible to each other's judgment for both a first and second time would
offer a strong likelihood of justice in most academic cases.
10148 id. 9 (1962).
"I2 AcADEmc DuE Paocass 7.
108 Statement on Procedural Standards 274. At the beginning of this study it was noted that the
X925, 194o, and 1958 statements were jointly promulgated by the AAUP and the Association of American
Colleges. Here, near the end of the systematic analysis, it is well to remember that in these three instances
there were partners in the enterprise.
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The cases which involve appellate problems are not numerous if one looks only
to the procedure involved, although there are numerous instances of arbitrary over-
riding of faculty judgment. At the University of Michigan a superior committee gave
a hearing to a teacher involved, but "it based its hearing and its conclusions very
largely upon the record of the hearing held by [an inferior committee] . .. which
record had not been made available to the two teachers.' 0 4 And, as noted above,100
the teacher did not have adequate time to study the record of the first hearing. Even
less happy is the recent University of Illinois-Koch case where the governing board
unanimously overruled the recommendation regarding penalty offered by unanimous
vote of the faculty hearing committee.106
III
OvER-ALL DENIAL OF ACADEMIC DuE PRoCEsS
The reports which describe a general denial of academic due process to some
unfortunate teacher are dramatic and even lurid, but it must be confessed that they
may contribute less to the understanding of academic due process than to the annals
of social pathology. In most cases the broad denial of procedural rights to a faculty
member usually turns out to be a matter of ignorance or fear, or some amalgam of
these two saddening aspects of institutional compulsiveness.
"Although the dismissal... was for stated cause, neither evidence nor argument
was presented in a hearing before any faculty committee, or any Board committee,
or the Board as a whole within the framework of any recognizable form of due
process, academic or general.' 07 The opinion of the investigating committee
which examined the Grove City College situation for the American Association of
University Professors led to the further conclusion that "the absence of due process
in this case raises in the minds of the Investigating Committee grave doubts regard-
ing the academic security of any persons who may hold appointment at Grove City
College under existing administrative practice."'0 s  There have, of course, been
other instances of blank denial.' 9 The usual picture is a large composition which may
include a denial of charges or the exploration of charges so general as to be
irrefutable by ordinary means, absence of counsel, failure to make a record, no
hearing before a faculty committee, no hearing before anyone, or plain dismissal
as of the moment of notification.
Sometimes the denial of due process is mitigated by elements of confusion; in
the University of Vermont-Novikoff case nobody was familiar with and called upon
procedural safeguards which actually existed in the Articles of Organization of the
104 44 A.A.U.P. Bu-. 61 (1958).
1 0 Supra at 596.
10 49 A.A.U.P. Bu.L. 29-31 (1963).
'
7 Id. at 16 (1963).
208 Ibid.
109 Eastern Washington College, 43 A.A.U.P. BuLi. 235 (1957); Fisk University, 45 id. 36-37 (959);
Alcorn Agricultural and Mechanical College, 48 id. 251 (x96.2).
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University.110 Or, as in the George Washington University-Reichard case, the denial
seems to have come about from a mixture of dubious legalism, ill-defined function
of the examining group, and short-sighted failure to seek out information which
was needed and could be had. 1'
Since institutions are no more exempt from fear than individual men, it is not
surprising to find colleges and universities attempting to dispose of irritants by sum-
mary action, usually involving denial of established principles of academic due
process. Thus, Benedict College first offered "normal academic procedures" to a
faculty member with tenure, and then denied him a hearing." 2 At Alabama Poly-
technic Institute (now Auburn University), long after the president's office had
assumed a minor matter to have died down, the governing board met in executive
session and denied reappointment to a teacher without even a semblance of a hear-
ing." 3 In the same commonwealth, the president of the Alabama State College
wrote to a professor, saying, "Just a few minutes ago I had the telephone message
through the State Superintendent of Education that the State Board of Education
has directed this afternoon that your services be discontinued as of this afternoon.""'
And, most recently, the Board of Regents of Texas State Teachers Colleges gave a
faculty member notice of a hearing only at 2z:oo P.M. of the preceding day, and also
indicated that he would have his hearing only if he signed a waiver of a bill of par-
ticulars; the "hearing" took place and the teacher found himself conclusively dis-
missed." 5
The annals of the Visigoths of American education soon pall, and, in any event,
are not very instructive for any positive purpose. Consequently, this brief review
of instances of virtually total denial of academic due process may conclude with
one last example: a case which presents a few elements of academic due process but
introduces other procedural distortions of a most extraordinary nature. The hearing
took place before the Board of Trustees of the Lowell Technological Institute, an
institution situated in Massachusetts about thirty miles distant from Harvard Uni-
versity and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
In the Lowell Technological Institute-Snitzer and Fine cases, there were no
charges; unsworn evidence was introduced into a record where other evidence was
under oath; there were no findings or judgments on the evidence. Counsel for
the teachers was present; and carefully introduced at the beginning, and recapitulated
at the end, the elements of academic due process. But the Board had its mind on
another way of doing things. The Assistant Attorney General of the state of Massa-
chusetts in charge of criminal investigations was asked by the Board to conduct the
hearing; he acted as prosecutor and also ruled as judge on the admissibility of
110 44 id. 13 (1959).
111 48 id. 240 (x962).
112 46 id. ioi (ig6o).
11a 44 id. X58 et seq. (1958).
1% 47 id. 3o6 (ig6x).
115 49 id. 46 (1963).
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objections. To complete the picture, the Assistant Attorney General then apparently
went into executive session with the Board as a person in the jury room. The
American Association of University Professors was denied the right to have an
observer present; a lieutenant of the Massachusetts state police was in attendance
throughout the hearing. And yet the Assistant Attorney General stipulated that
no issue of criminal behavior had been raised; nor was any ever raised. In short,
the whole record of the event over which the Board of Trustees presided probably
constitutes the further limit to which any governing body has gone in outright
disregard of the established principles and practices by which determinations of
justice are made on the academic scene. 16
IV
Ti FuuRE OF ACADEMIC DuE PRocEss
The American college or university, like any living organism, is constantly
changing, as current values and passions tangle with old traditions and inertias. And,
in any particular institution, academic due process is likely to be particularly shaped
by the interplay of the campus pattern for handling controversial matters and public
opinion regarding the "sensitive question" of the moment. So fluid a scene, so
delicate and mobile a balance, obviously means that academic due process will
experience a good deal of change as life moves on. The prospects for such change
merit brief notice.
First, there will be change in academic due process resulting from ordinary
self-scrutiny. Procedures which have proved useful will receive a blessing as intelli-
gent custom and become stronger; failures and archaisms will drop out. There will
be fillings-in to take care of the obvious gaps revealed by logic or pain.
It may be possible to rely less upon analogy and more upon critical com-
parison with other kinds of systems for being fair. Useful exploration may suggest
differences in the problems arising in public and private institutions. Academic due
process for these two types of college or university may, of course, have to wait
upon the discovery of the actual distinctions which exist between private and public
college or university. In the private institution the supposed base is in the contract.
But is an institution really private which receives tax exemption for itself, establishes
tax deduction for its donors, and has ninety per cent of its operations in some of its
chief departments paid for by government funds?
As for the unquestionably public institution, nonlawyers are unable to escape
hearing of a few uncertainties. They know about the large body of administrative
law which concerns itself with the delegated authority and responsibility of public
agencies, constitutional or statutory in origin, and seek to discover how much of
that law is relevant to an agency which is an institution of higher education. There
li 45 id. 550-67 (1959).
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is a suspicion abroad that the silences on this point are vast, and that the voices heard
are sometimes not in harmony'
1 7
Second, academic due process will develop as it confronts the threats always
made against anything which is in any way connected with freedom. Chafee's great
first chapter of Free Speech in the United States remains one of the wisest, and one
of the saddest, commentaries ever written on human nature. He tells us that freedom
rises and falls almost in exact relationship to our fears and insecurity. And there is
no reason to believe that the particular kind of freedom which exists in the academy
has any magic which will exempt it from the generic fate.
Third, academic due process will need to keep its integrity when it observes the
seductive success of other kinds of systems which have proved effective in apparently
like affairs. For instance, the civil service system offers some very attractive safe-
guards. But civil service is mainly intended to protect large groups of persons who
are willing to accept a large measure of routinization in the personnel decisions which
affect their lives. They are willing to move forward at a generally even pace, treated
with generally even fairness, and-in time of trouble-to be judged by broadly
applicable standards and procedures. There is no implication in this observation that
civil service is a poorer kind of thing than academic due process. It is simply
different, and not particularly suited to the judgments which may attend the ad-
venturous journey of a professor who begins as a servant in the hall of Poison Bluff
College and concludes his career ruling over a ducal seigniory at a major university.
Fourth, it seems likely that the future of academic due process will in the main be
dependent upon its close identification, as a necessary instrumentality, with the
fundamental principle of intellectual freedom. It is intellectual freedom, in the
college or university called academic freedom, which is the object of value. It is the
principle that must be protected at all costs. This will sometimes require especially
sensitive, peculiarly complicated, procedures for handling the problems of the
men who work under the principle of freedom. Obviously, tried and good ideas
should not be abandoned without thorough scrutiny and the widest possible experi-
ence; it is not likely that the idea of confrontation will depart from academic due
process. On the other hand, the instrument must be flexible and subject to needed
modification. In every instance, the process which best assists in the wise and just
handling of people using free minds will be the best academic due process.
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